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BOOTH V. MARYLAND, INSIGHTS INTO THE
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO JUDGING
JOAN M. SHAUJHNESSY*
INTRODUCTION

The question I address in this paper is what many have recently described
as a major contemporary challenge to judging.' For many years, possibly
for as long as our system of adjudication has existed in its present form,
trial lawyers have known what scholars have discovered only recently. Trial
lawyers have never thought, as legal scholars for many years seemingly
believed, that the law is a rational science with rational means of proof,
from which emotion should be divorced as far as humanly possible. To the
contrary, trial lawyers have always understood that their job entails, in
large part, presenting an emotional case for the2 application of seemingly
emotion-free legal rules and judicial instructions.
The role of emotion in legal decisionmaking, particularly in the area of
criminal law, is multifaceted. First, the human tragedies relived in the
criminal courtroom almost inevitably involve strong emotions on the part
of the actors. Assessment of blame for the tragedy thus necessarily requires
an understanding of those emotions by the trier of fact. But the role of
emotion goes further than a requirement that the trier of fact acknowledge
the emotions of those involved in the litigation. As moral philosophers have
noted, human action is not the result solely of reason.3 To move from

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. My

thanks and appreciation to Bill Geimer, Moira Roberts, Brian Murchison, Catharine Wells,

and the Frances Lewis Law Center for their assistance and support.
1. See, e.g., JoHN F. NOONAN, JR., PisoNs AND Mss OF THE LAW (1976); A.

Morgan Cloud III et al., Conference of Association of American Law Schools: Panel on
Compassion and Judging, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 13 (1970); Colloquy, Human Voice in Legal

Discourse, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1988); Tristan Tayle Duncan, Narrative Jurisprudence: The
Remystification of the Law, 7 J.L. & REuGION 105 (1989); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and

Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REy. 1574 (1987); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. Rav.
2073 (1989); Symposium, Reason, Passion and Justice Brennan, 10 CARDozo L. Ray. 1 (1988).
2. See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JoHN SONSTENO, TRiAL: THnores, TAcTics AND

TECHmQuES 638-39 (1991); Richard L. Tegtmeier, Theory of the Defense, 42 MERCER L. Rv.
593, 600 (1991) (stating "Every case has a dominant emotion. In truth, jurors do not decide
cases based upon facts. They decide them on the gut level instincts and feelings that they
associate with or against your client."). I would put the matter differently than does Mr.
Tegtmeier. I would argue that the facts of a criminal case are emotionally charged and that,
to persuade the juror, emotions must be elicited and explained, not ignored. Robert B.
Hirschhorn, Opening Statements, 42 MERCER L. Rnv., 605, 612 (1991) (stating "People are
motivated and persuaded by feelings."); Drew Findling, ClosingArgument: Tapping the Human
Experience, 42 MERCER L. Rnv. 659 (1991).
3. See Edward de Grazia, Humane Law and Humanistic Justice, 10 CARUozo L. Rv.
25 (1988) for a discussion of the philosophical arguments.
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reason through decision to action requires involvement of the actor's emotions. Second, the law asks the trier of fact in a serious criminal case to
engage in actions which have serious consequences. A finding of guilt in
such a case entails as a consequence punishment up to and including death.
A finding of not guilty also entails serious consequences-emotional pain
for those who feel they were harmed by the acquitted defendant and possible
danger for others if the decision was erroneous. Third, some have argued
with persuasive force that the substantive law of crimes itself is founded in
large part on the general emotional reaction of society to offenses which it
has chosen to punish.4 The very underpinning of criminal law-the justification for its application-is not a rational, emotion-free calculus but,
5
appropriately, a deeply felt community response to outrageous conduct.
Thus, in approaching the trial of a criminal case, emotions are a large,
often critical, consideration for the prosecution and for the defense. First,
attorneys must show and help the trier of fact to understand the strong
emotions of those involved in the crime. Without such information and
understanding, the actions of the participants and the reasons for their
conduct may be utterly inexplicable. Next, the trial lawyer must seek to
invoke an emotional response from jurors that will lead them from understanding to action. Lastly, it is the task of the advocate, under this
understanding of the criminal law and its process, to bring home to the
jury the emotional basis underlying the substantive criminal law. In this
way, the jury is moved to act in accordance with the community norms
6
reflected in the substantive law.
Traditionally, the law has not completely ignored the presence of
emotion in criminal litigation; rather, the law has sought to disguise the
role and importance of emotion. For example, trial lawyers' work in
exposing the trier of fact to the emotions and the feelings of the litigants

4. See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1990); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the

Passions of CriminalPunishment, 74 Co.NsuLI L. REv. 655 (1991).

5. I do not mean to suggest, in any argument I make in this article, that legal
decisionmakers are, can be or should be, indifferent to the law, including the demand (if it is
made) to set aside emotion in favor of the hard demands of the rule of law. I believe that
legal decisionmakers clearly are profoundly influenced by their understanding of the duties

demanded by their role in the legal system. That influence can be beneficial in protecting
against dangers ranging from thoughtlessness to deep prejudice. That influence can also be

pernicious, by robbing legal decisionmakers of the approbation needed to bring their emotions
to bear and by providing them with a shelter to deny responsibility for wrenching decisions.
See generallyROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); sources cited supra note 1 (addressing
judicial resort to law and legalism); Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REv.
305; William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRns. L. 1 (1987-88); Wm~sH S. WHrr, THE
DrEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTS (1987) (for effect in capital cases of jury belief in legal
inevitability of their vote for death); see also Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 1359
(for uses of demands of Rule of Law in countering prejudice).
6. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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has been constrained, but by no means prevented, through the doctrine of
relevance. In theory, the doctrine of relevance forces the trial of emotional
issues into a reasoned, rational framework. The rule of relevance customarily
has taken the form of a syllogism-any fact put before the jury must make
a legal finding more or less likely. 7 Moreover, relevant evidence has been
excluded if found to be unfairly prejudicial; emotion has been the quintessential example of unfair prejudice.' Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the
requirement of relevance has left wide room for trial lawyers to paint an
emotional picture for jurors. For example, courts routinely permit the use
of color photographs of the victim of a homicide, ostensibly offered to
illustrate the dry and technical medical testimony concerning the cause of
death. 9 Similarly, rules permitting evidence concerning the character of the
victim and of the accused allow the criminal defense substantial leeway to
provide an emotional context for its case.' 0 Good trial lawyers can, and do,
use the rational framework of the evidence rules to tell compelling human
stories."
Similarly, while the law has purported to restrict argument appealing
to the emotions of the trier of fact, in practice attorneys .have had wide2
latitude in making their arguments, particularly when made to a jury.
While courts have disapproved particularly distasteful appeals-for example,
blatantly racist arguments and arguments designed to instill personal fearcounsel have been permitted wide latitude to invoke emotional involvement
and an emotional stake in decisionmaking on the part of jurors.
Finally, the law has cloaked in secrecy the actual deliberations of jurors.
This permits the relatively free reign of emotion in the jury room 3 and
perpetrates the illusion that jurors proceed by reasoning syllogistically from
a finding of a particular fact to an application of the judge's reasoned
instructions to a final verdict. This illusion is frequently bolstered by the
traditional instruction that tells jurors not to take account of sympathy or
14
prejudice.
The appellate judicial process seems to treat the role of emotion in a
similar fashion. 5 Judicial opinions are presented in the voice of objective
rationality, from which the explicit invocation and judgment of the emo-

7.

FED.

R. Evm. 401.

8. FED. R. Evm. 403; FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note.
9. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 47-51 (describing profound effect photos

of homicide victims may have on jurors).
10. FED. R. Ev. 404(a)(1) & (2); but see FED. R. Evm. 412.
11. W. LANCE Bmrmvan & MARTHA S. FEr.DmAN, RECONSTRUCTiNo REA=IY IN THE
CouRTRooM (1981).
12. See generally Welsh S. White, Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial,
18 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 297 (1990-91); Weisberg, supra note 5, at 363-83.
13. See generally Victoria Slind-Flor, Counties Begin to Help Jurors Cope Afterward in
Grisly Trials, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 3 (describing emotional effect on jurors of service

in serious criminal cases).
14. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
15. See sources cited supra note 1.
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tional context of a dispute are largely absent. Instead, logical legal doctrine
comes to the fore and the emotions of the parties and their judges are
largely obscured. This is not to say that emotion plays no role in appellate
judging, but rather that the role emotion plays is largely suppressed in
decisions as they are presented and explained by judges.
Many legal scholars have argued persuasively that the law's distrust of
emotion is both erroneous and harmful to good legal decisionmaking. For
example, Justice Brennan in his Cardozo lecture argued that "[the] internal
dialogue of reason and passion, does not taint the judicial process, but is
in fact central to its vitality. ' 16 Numerous commentators wholeheartedly
accept Brennan's view.'" Recognition of the centrality of emotion provides
both a better explanation for the way in which law operates and a suggestion
for better legal decisionmaking in the future. As others have noted, it is
encouraging to hear a Supreme Court nominee declare that the qualities of
a "good judge" include "compassion, warmth, sensitivity, and an unyielding
insistence on justice."'"
Nevertheless, in our enthusiasm for the constructive role emotion can
play in legal decisionmaking, it is important to try to understand the limits
and dangers of the use of emotion. An exploration of a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Booth v. Maryland 9 authored by Justice
Powell, will help to develop and refine the boundaries of emotion in
litigation.
Booth was not a landmark opinion. It did not establish any great
principles of constitutional analysis. It is not a model of legal analysis,
never had wide applicability, and was rather quickly overruled. 20 Moreover,
the Booth opinion reflects a distrust of emotion which is contrary to much
recent jurisprudential writing. Nevertheless, the Booth case and other recent
capital decisions provide a vehicle for examining the virtues and vices of
the appeal to emotion in litigation.
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Booth begins with a brief
description of the facts:
In 1983, Irvin Bronstein, 78, and his wife Rose, 75, were robbed
and murdered in their West Baltimore home. The murderers, John

16. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and the Progress of the Law, 10 CARDozo
L. R-v. 3, 3 (1988).
17. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.

18. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirationsfor our
Judges, 60 S. CAL. L. Rnv., 187, 192 n.188 (1988). I am indebted to Professor Resnik for
this quotation. Professor Resnik states that this quote from then Judge Kennedy, according
to the New York Times, was in a written answer supplied to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Many of Professor Resnik's fine insights into the need for attention to emotion by judges can
be found in the foregoing article; in Judith Resnik, Changing Criteriafor Judging Judges, 84
Nw. L. Rnv. 889 (1990); and in Judith Resnik, Feminism and the Language of Judging, 22
Amiz. ST. L.J. 31 (1990).
19. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
20. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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Booth and Willie Reid, entered the victims' home for the apparent
purpose of stealing money to buy heroin. Booth, a neighbor of the
Bronsteins, knew that the elderly couple could identify him. The
victims were bound and gagged and then stabbed repeatedly in the
chest with a kitchen knife. 2The bodies were discovered two days
later by the Bronsteins' son. '
Booth was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and of lesser
offenses and a penalty trial was held to determine whether Booth would be
sentenced to death.Y At the penalty trial, a Victim Impact Statement,
prepared by the State Division of Parole and Probation, was read to the
jury.23 The Victim Impact Statement is reproduced as an appendix to Justice
Powell's opinion in Booth.24 The statement is a vivid and wrenching depiction of a grief-stricken family and of the people they loved and horribly
lost. The conclusion, for example, reads,
The family states that Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein were extremely good
people who wouldn't hurt a fly. Because of their loss, a terrible
void has been put into their lives and every day is still a strain just
to get through. It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she
talked to the family members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs.
Bronstein is still such a shocking painful and devastating memory
to them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is
doubtful that they will ever be able to fully recover from this
tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner
in which their loved ones were murdered and taken from them.Y
The Victim Impact Statement also reflected the family's anger and desire
for retribution. For example, it contained the following comments:
The victims' son feels that his parents were not killed but were
butchered like animals. He doesn't think anyone should be able to
do something like that and get away with it.2
The victims' daughter states that animals wouldn't do this.... The
murders show the viciousness of the killers' anger. She doesn't feel
that the people who did this could ever be rehabilitated and she
doesn't want them to be able to do this again or put another family
through this. 27
The family wants the whole thing to be over with and they would
like to see swift and just punishment. 28

21. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497-98 (1987).
22. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498.
23. Id. at 501.

24. Id. at 509-15.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

514-15.
512.
513.
514.
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Booth offered no evidence to rebut the Victim Impact Statement.29 The
jury sentenced him to death for the murder of Mr. Bronstein and to life
imprisonment for the murder of Mrs. Bronstein."
The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed 3 and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, reversed.
The Court's holding was based upon the Eighth Amendment. It found
that the information contained in the Victim Impact Statement was "irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its admission creates a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. ' 32 The Court, drawing on its earlier
capital cases, described the constitutionally required task of the sentencing
jury as one of "determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in
light of the background and record of the accused and the particular
circumstances of the crime." 33 The reaction of the victim's family to the
crime, in the Court's view, had no bearing on this task and had no
relationship to the blameworthiness of the capital defendant. 34 The Court
opined that to permit a decision on life or death to turn on a Victim Impact
Statement would therefore be arbitrary. Moreover, the Court held that
admission of the family's "emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with
'35
the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases."
The Court's opinion in Booth was an attempt to realize a long-held
goal-that "any decision to impose the death sentence must be ...

based

on reason rather than caprice or emotion. ' 3 6 In Booth, Justice Powell
starkly presented what has been viewed as a dichotomy between reason and
emotion and chose reason.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly faced the tension between reason
and emotion in its capital decisions, with a surprising lack of consistency
or willingness to confront the problem which continues to haunt its decisions.
This is not the place to retell the saga of Furman v. Georgia37 and its

29. Id. at 518.
30. Id. at 501.
31. Booth v. Maryland, 507 A.2d 1098 (Md. 1986), vacated in part, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
32. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987).
33. Id. at 507.
34. Id.at 508.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court struck down several death
sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds. Although there was no opinion for the Court in
Furman, the result of the various concurring opinions was to invalidate most, if not all, thenexisting capital punishment schemes. In the years that followed, state legislatures, responding
to Furman, enacted new capital statutes. In 1976 the Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), affirmed a sentence of death imposed under Georgia's post-Furman
statute, putting to rest the question of whether Furman had invalidated all capital punishment.
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progeny.3 8 Nevertheless, the capital cases may be seen in part as the Court's
struggle to deal with an issue for which modern law has left the Court
utterly unequipped-the uses and dangers of emotion in judging. 9
The classic understanding of law-however severely it has been criticized
in recent years-has always been of a rational deliberative science. From
time to time, the sources to be consulted in conducting the called-for
rational inquiry have varied. In the fabled days of Langdell, law was
regarded as self-generating and capable of being adduced from a study of
judicial decisions. As time went by, the emphasis shifted to the use of data
from the social sciences or from that vaguest of judicial sources-public
policy. More recently still, some have urged that economics or history
should form the core sources of data for the legal reasoner. Nevertheless,
until recently, the emphasis was almost exclusively on reason, using whatever
sources seemed most appropriate to the task at hand. Emotion was regarded
as a regrettable and dangerous sensation in a legal decisionmaker, to be
minimized and avoided wherever possible.
It was in the capital cases that the Court was finally forced to confront
directly the limits of reason in legal decisionmaking. As the Court recognized
in Furman v. Georgia,4° the penalty of death, at least in the 1960s and
early 1970s, was inflicted on only a few of the persons who committed
crimes punishable by death.4 1 Several justices concurring in the Furman
42
judgment found the death penalty arbitrary and capricious for that reason.
Accordingly, after Furman the stage was set for the Court to hold the death
penalty constitutionally valid if it could be administered in accordance with
neutral, objective rules.
Inevitably, the post-Furman cases forced the Court to confront the
consequences of such a position. The series of decisions which came during
the 1975 term of the Court, and which set the framework for modem death
penalty jurisprudence, included Woodson v. North Carolina.43 In fthe plu-

38. One of the finest discussions of post-Furmanjurisprudence can be found in Weisburg,
supra note 5.
39. For a splendid and far more developed discussion of the role of emotion in judging,
see Pillsbury, supra note 4.
40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. It remains the case today, of course, that only a minute percentage of all homicides
result in execution of the perpetrator. Compare U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States: 1991 (11 1th ed.), Washington, D.C., 1991 at 176, Table 292 (approximately
21,500 murders committed in United States in 1989) with id. at 197, Table 342 (16 prisoners

executed in United States, all for murder, in 1989). The 1989 executions were beyond doubt
for crimes committed in earlier years, but the statistics nevertheless reveal the order of
magnitude involved.
42. Furman v. George, 408 U.S. 238, 248-49 n.11 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-16 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White,
J., concurring). Of these opinions, those of Justices Stewart and White turned on the rarity

of death sentences, as reflected in Justice Stewart's well-known phrase, "These death sentences
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."

Id. at 309.
43. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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rality opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens,
the Court rejected North Carolina's mandatory death scheme, inter alia, on
the ground that "[a] process that accords no significance to relevant facets

of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances
of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors

44
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."
In Lockett v. Ohio,45 the Court held 46 that capital defendants must
constitutionally be permitted to offer evidence on any aspect of their
character, their record or the circumstances of their offense. 47 The Court
based its decision on "[tihe need for treating each defendant in a capital
4

case with that degree of respect due to the uniqueness of the individual."
Thus, in Woodson and Lockett the Court seems to have constitutionalized

the view that certain emotions cannot
be excluded from consideration in
49
deciding between death and life.

Following Woodson and Lockett, the door was open for defendants in
capital sentencing proceedings to offer a full range of evidence, including
emotional evidence, concerning the defendant's character, background, and
actions. Capital defendants can proffer and have proffered all of this

evidence to support arguments to the jury that some penalty less than death
was appropriate in a particular case. 0

44. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1978) (emphasis added).
45. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See Scott Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided
Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991),
and Louis O'Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment and the Lockett Doctrine,
82 J. CiuM. L. & CRnNoLoGY 283 (1991), for a complete discussion of Lockett and its role
in modern death penalty jurisprudence.
46. Justice Burger's opinion on this point was not technically an opinion for the Court.
It was written for himself and three other justices. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978).
However, it was effectively an opinion for the Court because, although Justice Marshall
concurred only in the judgment, he concurred on grounds that could properly be described as
broader and he clearly agreed with the plurality's position on the admissibility of individualized
factors. Id. at 620-21.
47. Id. at 604-05.
48. Id. at 605.
49. See generally Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
Capital Punishment, 99 YAIE L.J. 389 (1989) (discussing role of mercy in modem capital
punishment scheme).
50. The Court has so far refused to take the final step in legitimating the role of emotion
in capital decisionmaking. In California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the Court considered
an instruction to a capital sentencing jury which stated that [the jury] "must not be swayed
by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."
Brown, 479 U.S. at 540. The Court rejected the argument that this instruction "denie[d] [the]
capital defendant the right to have the jury consider any 'sympathy factor' raised by the
evidence when determining the appropriate penalty." Id. (quoting California Supreme Court's
decision below, People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 453 (1985)). The Supreme Court held that
the instruction was "a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally
divorced from the evidence." Id. at 542 (emphasis added). The Court thus left open the
possibility that a sentencing jury should be instructed to consider sympathy when it was evoked
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Woodson and Lockett were correctly decided. For all of the reasons
described earlier,51 it is completely appropriate and necessary that courts
give defendants an opportunity to present any evidence which might persuade
a trier of fact to avoid the death sentence. Juries are entitled to see and
understand the person they are being asked to condemn. The decision to
impose the death penalty cannot be made without emotion and should not
be made under the pretense that legal decisionmaking is emotion free. The
question then arises as to whether the decision in Booth v. Maryland can
be justified. Do not all of the reasons and arguments which might be
brought forward in favor of Woodson and Lockett apply equally to the
gives a 'glimpse of the life' which a defendant
offer of evidence which
'52
'chose to extinguish'?
I believe that Booth can be supported, but in order to do so it is
necessary to move beyond Justice Powell's rejection in Booth of emotion
in favor of reason.-3 Instead, it is necessary to look again at the arguments
supporting the use of emotion in legal decisionmaking and to recognize
their limits and their dangers. None of the arguments in favor of the use
of emotion in litigation can support the use of a Victim Impact Statement,
or similar sweeping evidence regarding the emotions of the survivors of a
murder, in a capital sentencing proceeding. First, as noted previously,
judgment of human action requires judgment of the emotions of the
participants in that action. Accordingly, in the guilt phase of a capital trial,
the parties will present much evidence which pertains to the emotions both
of the capital defendant and, where their emotions shed light on the
circumstances of the crime, of the victim and other actors. This type of
evidence might also be admissible at the sentencing phase of a capital trial
to shed light on the "character and record of the defendant and the
circumstances of the crime." But the evidence admitted in Booth went far
beyond the evidence needed for an assessment of the circumstances of the
offense. Its purpose and effect seemed to be geared far more directly to
the latter two uses I have suggested for emotion in litigation.
The Victim Impact Statement helped the state accomplish two purposes
in the sentencing phase of the capital trial. First, it provided a direct means
to involve the jury emotionally, in a way favorable to the state, in the
sentencing proceeding. It thus served as a sort of catalyst to move the jury

by the evidence, or, at least, should not be instructed to exclude sympathy in its deliberations.
In Saffle v. Parks, the Court refused to consider a similar argument in a habeas proceeding
on the ground that it urged a "new rule" and thus could not be applied on collateral review.
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990). But see Sundby, supra note 45, at 1191 n.145, 1196-97 n.170
(arguing that Saffle decided issue and upheld anti-sympathy instruction).
51. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
52. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
53. But see Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon". The Human Voice in Legal
Rules, 66 Tax. L. Rv.589, 603-06 (1988) (discussing Booth and taking more critical view of
use of emotion in legal decisionmaking).
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from knowledge to action. In Booth, the action sought from the jury was
a verdict of death as opposed to life. Second, the Victim Impact Statement
also fulfilled a role in bolstering and particularizing the emotional underpinnings of the criminal law, particularly of the death penalty. It permitted
the state to offer graphic, emotional evidence of particular survivors' desire
for retribution against the defendant.
Neither of these uses are valid reasons for permitting parties to offer
such evidence in a sentencing proceeding. The superficial equality between
emotional evidence concerning the defendant, offered in the hope of moving
the jury to vote for life, and emotional evidence concerning the victim,
offered in the hope of moving the jury to vote for death, 54 will not sustain
analysis. The simple and tragic truth is that the victim and the defendant
are not equally situated before the capital sentencing jury. The capital
sentencing jury has only one life in its hands-that of the defendant. At
best, the victim's family will obtain a sense of catharsis and a belief that
they have been heard by being allowed to put before a jury their memories
of the victim and their grief at the victim's death. However, the law offers
the jury only one way to compensate the victim's survivors for the pain
that is so graphically demonstrated before the jury. That way, in the context
of a capital sentencing proceeding, is to choose the death of the defendant
over the life of the defendant. It is not the least bit clear that, if given a
full range of remedial power, the jury would be moved to respond in that
way to survivors' emotions. But given the restraint, the jury can answer its
felt need to respond only with a verdict of death. Evidence of survivors'
emotions, therefore, poses a serious risk of distorting the jury's judgment
on the only question before it-whether the defendant is one of those few
offenders modem American society deems deserving of execution.
The danger of distortion is heightened by the very strong possibility
that, if given evidence that asks the jury to choose between emotional
response in favor of the capital defendant and emotional response in favor
of the victim, the jury will almost certainly turn away from the defendant
and toward the victim and the victim's survivors. The victim and the victim's
survivors are far more likely to be persons whose lives are similar to those
of the persons on the jury, whose character and actions the jury can readily
understand, and with whose grief the jury may feel able to identify. By
contrast, many of the factors which are so likely to lead to the defendant
finding himself faced with a capital sentencing proceeding are elements far
less likely to be within the purview of an ordinary jury. For example, there
is substantial evidence that a large proportion of those sentenced to death
in capital proceedings suffer from substantial mental impairment or disturbance. 55 Moreover, many capital defendants suffered severe deprivation,

54. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Richard H. Burr III, Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics
of Advocacy, 59 UMKC L. Rv. 1, 3 n.3 (1990) (citing psychiatric evidence); Michael Mello
& Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionalityof the Proposed Six-Month Time

1992]

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO JUDGING

289

abuse, or both as children, the effects of which are outside the experience
of most jurors. Finally, of course, the jury sitting on the sentencing decision
has already found the defendant guilty of murder-frequently a crime
difficult or impossible for the jurors* to understand, much less empathize
with. 6 In addition, by their earlier verdict, the jury has to some extent
publicly committed itself to the prosecution and its position.17 The danger
that the jury will not respond with equal consideration to evidence from
each party is particularly acute in light of the substantial evidence that
"death-qualified" jurors" are particularly receptive to prosecution evidence
and arguments.5 9 For these reasons, the arguments in favor of recognizing
and using victim emotion in the particular moral judgment that results from
a capital sentencing procedure are fundamentally flawed.
Nor is it appropriate, given the current structure of capital punishment
in America, to permit the state to offer Victim Impact Statements as a way
of particularizing the general retribution argument in favor of capital
punishment. The argument that retribution is the appropriate emotional

basis for punishment assumes that retribution reflects the emotional reaction
of the community as a whole to the offense 0 To permit evidence of the
type offered in Booth, in which family members in the Victim Impact
Statement plead for death as a retributive punishment, is to substitute the
view of individuals for the views of the community at large. This introduces
an element of unequal treatment recognized by some of the opinions in

Booth and in Payne.61 Moreover, it forces those in the most emotionally

Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitionsby State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE, 451, 481-87 (1990-91) (gathering evidence of mental illness and retardation
among death row inmates).
56. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980); see also Robert L. Hayman,
Jr., Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mentally Retarded Label in Death Penalty
Sentencing, 59 UMKC L. REv. 17, 45-53 (1990) (explicating this danger as it applies to mentally
retarded defendants); see generally Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and the
Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 1987 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989) (discussing limits
of empathy).
57. WmrE, supra note 5, at 95-98 (discussing problem of commitment to prior decision
in context of prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument).
58. The term "death-qualified" jurors refers to those jurors chosen after a voir dire
process designed to identify and excuse for cause venire persons whose beliefs would not allow
them to vote for death. The Supreme Court limited the scope, but did not prohibit the use,
of such exclusions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
59. See id. at 162-94 (discussing studies showing that "death-qualified" jurors are
sympathetic to prosecution arguments). In Lockart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the
Supreme Court refused to find that a "death qualified" jury violated a capital defendant's
right to an impartial jury in the guilt phase.
60. Scott Burris, Note, Death and Rational Justice: A Conversation on the Capital
Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens, 96 YALE L.J. 521, 537-39 (1987).
61. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2620-21 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1989). In
addition, the defense in a case in which victim impact evidence is offered is put in the position
of choosing between two equally destructive alternatives. It may seek to meet the prosecution's
favorable evidence about the victim with attacks on the victim's character and relationships,
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vulnerable position-the survivors of a murder victim-to choose whether
to officially seek retribution through the death penalty. The victim's survivors cannot be expected to express the judgment of the community as a
whole, and it may be cruel to force them to a choice they may later regret. 62
This paper is part of a symposium in honor of Justice Lewis Powell.
Perhaps it might fairly be said that I honor Justice Powell with faint praise.
Certainly, it is not my intention to defend Justice Powell's position on the
death penalty or his capital decisions. Moreover, as I hope this paper has
made clear, I do not share the view of judging implicit in Justice Powell's
Booth opinion. Nevertheless, I think Justice Powell's opinion in Booth
demonstrates, as much as he himself might deny it, how central and
important the role of human emotion is in judging, whether judgment is
rendered by a Supreme Court Justice or by one of twelve jurors in the first
stage of a criminal proceeding.
On the occasion of his retirement, Justice Powell gave an interview to
the New York Times. In it, he is quoted as saying,
I never think of myself as having a judicial philosophy, I have in
mind that each one of these cases is enormously important to the
parties, particularly the defendant in a criminal case. I try to be
to try to
careful, to do justice to the particular case, rather than
63
write principle that will be new, original, or whatever.
It would be a foolish misdescription of Justice Powell to suggest that he
was anything other than firmly committed in his work, in his life and in
his decisions to the proposition that the rule of law in all its senses governs
the work of lawyers, of judges, and of courts. But I find a hint of something
more in Justice Powell's self-description: in the description of a man who
did not come to the Court with a judicial philosophy; in the description of
a man who kept in mind the importance of individual cases to the parties,
particularly to a criminal defendant.
There was in Justice Powell, who came to the Supreme Court from a
lifetime in the practice of law, an implicit understanding that law is more
than a cold, rule-bound calculus, from whatever source. There was in Justice
Powell some instinct for the operation of the rule of law on real people,
with all of their powerful emotions and all of their human failings. There
was also in Justice Powell a recognition of the need to channel and control
those reactions in a court of law. It is that knowledge and that recognition

thus causing fresh pain to survivors and appearing cruel and relentless to the jury, or it may
let the evidence go unanswered, at the possible cost of the defendant's life. Such a choice is

more than a "tactical" decision, see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 518 n.3 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting); it is a "Catch-22" to which no person on trial for his or her life should be
subjected.
62. SmRLEY DICKS, DEATH Row 38-41 (1990) (statement of Marie Deans); Lynne V.
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims Rights, 37 STA. L. REv. 937, 996-99 (1985).
63. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Powell on His Approach: Doing Justice Case by Case, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 12, 1987, § 1, at 1.
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which led to Booth, and which are reflected in the many tributes to him
upon his retirement, whose common chord seems to be a recognition of
Justice Powell's virtues both of detachment and of concern for the particularities of each case before himA4
To take the jurisprudence of emotion seriously is to call for legal
scholars and judges to come to an explicit understanding, and development,
of the countervailing pressures of detachment and legality on the one hand
and emotion and factual particularity on the other hand. Justice Powell, a
man of his time, did not explicitly confront this difficulty. If we, as legal
scholars today, are to do more than simply react against the excesses of
legality, we must seek to find explicitly what Justice Powell found implicitly
in his work on the Court. We must seek a framework which will permit
genuine, discerning judgment of the cases brought before our courts. Such
a framework must include a full recognition of the inevitable emotional
dimensions of legal decisionmaking, and a means by which emotions can
be guided, addressed and, ultimately, accepted or rejected

64. See, e.g., A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARv. L. REV. 395, 39596 (1987) (statement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor); id. at 403 (statement of Richard H.
Fallon, Jr.); id. at 418-19 (statement of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III); Linda Greenhouse,
Powell: Moderation Amid Divisions, N.Y. T.Sas, June 27, 1987, § 1, at 32.

